Clement Greenberg’s Theory of Art

T. J. Clark

In the issue of Partisan Review for Fall 1939 appeared an article by Clement Greenberg entitled “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.” It was followed four issues later, in July-August 1940, by another wide-ranging essay on modern art, “Towards a Newer Laocoon.”1 These two articles, I believe, stake out the ground for Greenberg’s later practice as a critic and set down the main lines of a theory and history of culture since 1850—since, shall we say, Courbet and Baudelaire. Greenberg reprinted “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” making no attempt to tone down its mordant hostility to capitalism, as the opening item of his collection of critical essays, Art and Culture, in 1961. “Towards a Newer Laocoon” was not reprinted, perhaps because the author felt that its arguments were made more effectively in some of his later, more particular pieces included in Art and Culture—the essays on “Collage” or “Cézanne,” for example, or the brief paragraphs on “Abstract, Representational, and So Forth.” I am not sure that the author was right to omit the piece: it is noble, lucid, and extraordinarily balanced, it seems to me, in its defense of abstract art and avant-garde culture; and certainly its arguments are taken up directly, sometimes almost verbatim, in the more famous theoretical study which appeared in Art and Literature (Spring 1965) with the balder title “Modernist Painting.”

1. See Clement Greenberg, “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” Partisan Review 6 (Fall 1939): 34–49, and “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” Partisan Review 7 (July–August 1940): 296–310; all further references to these essays, abbreviated “AK” and “NL” respectively, will be included in the text.

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The essays of 1939 and 1940 argue already for what were to become Greenberg’s main preoccupations and commitments as a critic. And the arguments adduced, as the author himself admits at the end of “Towards a Newer Laocoon,” are largely historical. “I find,” Greenberg writes there, “that I have offered no other explanation for the present superiority of abstract art than its historical justification. So what I have written has turned out to be an historical apology for abstract art” (“NL,” p. 310). The author’s proffered half-surprise at having thus “turned out” to be composing an apology in the historical manner should not of course be taken literally. For it was historical consciousness, Greenberg had argued in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch,” which was the key to the avant-garde’s achievement—its ability, that is, to salvage something from the collapse of the bourgeois cultural order. “A part of Western bourgeois society,” Greenberg writes, “has produced something unheard of heretofore:—avant-garde culture. A superior consciousness of history—more precisely, the appearance of a new kind of criticism of society, an historical criticism—made this possible. . . . It was no accident, therefore, that the birth of the avant-garde coincided chronologically—and geographically, too—with the first bold development of scientific revolutionary thought in Europe” (“AK,” p. 35). By this last he means, need I say it, preeminently the thought of Marx, to whom the reader is grimly directed at the end of the essay, after a miserable and just description of fascism’s skill at providing “art for the people,” with the words: “Here, as in every other question today, it becomes necessary to quote Marx word for word. Today we no longer look toward socialism for a new culture—as inevitably as one will appear, once we do have socialism. Today we look to socialism simply for the preservation of whatever living culture we have right now” (“AK,” p. 49).

It is not intended as some sort of revelation on my part that Greenberg’s cultural theory was originally Marxist in its stresses and, indeed, in its attitude to what constituted explanation in such matters. I point out the Marxist and historical mode of proceeding as emphatically as I do partly because it may make my own procedure later in this paper seem a little less arbitrary. For I shall fall to arguing in the end with these essays’ Marxism and their history, and I want it understood that I think that to do so is to take issue with their strengths and their main drift.

But I have to admit there are difficulties here. The essays in question are quite brief. They are, I think, extremely well written: it was not for nothing that Partisan Review described Clement Greenberg, when he

first contributed to the journal early in 1939, as "a young writer who works in the New York customs house"—fine, redolent avant-garde pedigree, that! The language of these articles is forceful and easy, always straightforward, blessedly free from Marxist conundrums. Yet the price paid for such lucidity, here as so often, is a degree of inexplicitness—a certain amount of elegant skirting round the difficult issues, where one might otherwise be obliged to call out the ponderous armory of Marx's concepts and somewhat spoil the flow of the prose from one firm statement to another. The Marxism, in other words, is quite largely implicit; it is stated on occasion, with brittle and pugnacious finality, as the essays' frame of reference, but it remains to the reader to determine just how it works in the history and theory presented—what that history and theory depend on, in the way of Marxist assumptions about class and capital or even base and superstructure. That is what I intend to do in this paper: to interpret and extrapolate from the texts, even at the risk of making their Marxism declare itself more stridently than the "young writer" seems to have wished. And I should admit straight away that there are several points in what follows where I am genuinely uncertain as to whether I am diverging from Greenberg's argument or explaining it more fully. This does not worry me overmuch, as long as we are alerted to the special danger in this case, dealing with such transparent yet guarded prose, and as long as we can agree that the project in general—pressing home a Marxist reading of texts which situate themselves within the Marxist tradition—is a reasonable one.2

I should therefore add a word or two to conjure up the connotations of "Marxism" for a writer in 1939 in Partisan Review. I do not need to labour the point, I hope, that there was a considerable and various Marxist culture in New York at this time; it was not robust, not profound, but not frivolous or flimsy either, in the way of England in the same years; and it is worth spelling out how well the pages of Partisan Review in 1939 and 1940 mirrored its distinction and variety and its sense of impending doom. The issue in which the "Newer Laocoön" was pub-

2. This carelessness distinguishes the present paper from two recent studies of Greenberg's early writings, Serge Guilbaut's "The New Adventures of the Avant-Garde in America," October 15 (Winter 1980), and Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock's "Avant-Gardes and Partisans Reviewed," Art History 3 (September 1981). I am indebted to both these essays and am sure that their strictures on the superficiality—not to say the opportunism—of Greenberg's Marxism are largely right. (Certainly Mr. Greenberg would not now disagree with them.) But I am nonetheless interested in the challenge offered to most Marxist, and non-Marxist, accounts of modern history by what I take to be an justified, though extreme, pessimism as to the nature of established culture since 1870. That pessimism is characteristic, I suppose, of what Marxists call an ultraleftist point of view. I believe, as I say, that a version of some such view is correct and would therefore wish to treat Greenberg's theory as if it were a decently elaborated Marxism of an ultraleftist kind, one which issues in certain mistaken views (which I criticize) but which need not so issue and which might still provide, cleansed of those errors, a good vantage for a history of our culture.
lished began with an embattled article by Dwight MacDonald entitled “National Defense: The Case for Socialism,” whose two parts were headed “Death of a World” and “What Must We Do to Be Saved?” The article was a preliminary to the “Ten Propositions on the War” which MacDonald and Greenberg were to sign jointly a year later, in which they argued—still in the bleak days of 1941—for revolutionary abstention from a war between capitalist nation-states. It was a bleak time, then, in which Marxist convictions were often found hard to sustain, but still a time characterized by a certain energy and openness of Marxist thought, even in its moment of doubt. MacDonald had just finished a series of articles—an excellent series, written from an anti-Stalinist point of view—on Soviet cinema and its public. (It is one main point of reference in the closing sections of “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.”) Edmund Wilson in Fall 1938 could be seen pouring scorn on “The Marxist Dialectic,” in the same issue as André Breton and Diego Rivera’s “Manifesto: Towards a Free Revolutionary Art.” Philip Rahv pieced out “The Twilight of the Thirties” or “What Is Living and What Is Dead” in Marxism. Victor Serge’s Ville Conquise was published, partly, in translation. Meyer Schapiro took issue with To the Finland Station, and Bertram Wolfe reviewed Boris Souvarine’s great book on Stalin.

And so on. The point is simply that this was a Marxist culture—a hectic and shallow-rooted one, in many ways, but one which deserved the name. Its appetite for European culture—for French art and poetry in particular—is striking and discriminate, especially compared with later New York French enthusiasms. This was the time when Lionel Abel was translating Lautréamont and Delmore Schwartz, A Season in Hell. The pages of Partisan Review had Wallace Stevens alongside Trotsky, Paul Eluard next to Allen Tate, “East Coker”—I am scrupulous here—following “Marx and Lenin as Scapegoats.” No doubt the glamour of all this is misleading; but at least we can say, all reservations made, that a comparable roster of names and titles from any later period would look desultory by contrast, and rightly so.

Greenberg’s first contribution to the magazine, in early 1939, was a review of Bertolt Brecht’s Penny for the Poor, the novel taken from The Threepenny Opera. In it he discussed, sternly but with sympathy, the “nerve-wracking” formal monotony which derived, so he thought, from Brecht’s effort to write a parable—a consistent fiction—of life under capitalism. In the same issue as “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” there appeared an account of an interview which Greenberg had had, the previous year, with Ignazio Silone. The interviewer’s questions told the tale of his commitments without possibility of mistake: “What, in the light of their relations to political parties,” he asked, “do you think should be the role of revolutionary writers in the present situation?”; and then, “When you speak of liberty, do you mean socialist liberty?”; and then,
“Have you read Trotsky’s pamphlet, *Their Morals and Ours*? What do you think of it?”

I am aware of the absurdity of paying more heed to Greenberg’s questions than to Silone’s grand replies; but you see the point of all this for anyone trying in the end to read between the lines of the “Newer Laocoon.” And I hope that when, in a little while, I use the phrase “Eliotic Trotskyism” to describe Greenberg’s stance, it will seem less forced a coinage. Perhaps one should even add Brecht to Eliot and Trotsky here, since it seems that the example of Brecht was especially vivid for Greenberg in the years around 1940, representing as he did a difficult, powerful counterexample to all the critic wished to see as the main line of avant-garde activity: standing for active engagement in ideological struggle, not detachment from it, and suggesting that such struggle was not necessarily incompatible with work on the medium of theatre, making that medium explicit and opaque in the best avant-garde manner. (It is a pity that Greenberg, as far as I know, wrote only about Brecht’s novels and poetry. Doubtless he would have had critical things to say also about Brecht’s epic theatre, but the nature of his criticism—and especially his discussion of the tension between formal concentration and political purpose—might well have told us a great deal about the grounds of his ultimate settling for “purity” as the only feasible artistic ideal.)

All this has been by way of historical preliminary: if we are to read Greenberg’s essays of 1939 and 1940, it is necessary, I think, to bear this history in mind.

Let me begin my reading proper, then, by stating in summary form what I take to be the arguments of “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” and the “Newer Laocoon.” They are, as I have said, historical explanations of the course of avant-garde art since the mid-nineteenth century. They are seized with the strangeness of the avant-garde moment—that moment in which “a part of Western bourgeois society . . . produced something unheard of heretofore”; seized with its strangeness and not especially optimistic as to its chances of survival in the face of an ongoing breakdown of bourgeois civilization. For that is the context in which an avant-garde culture comes to be: it is a peculiar, indeed unique, reaction to a far from unprecedented cultural situation—to put it bluntly, the decadence of a society, the familiar weariness and confusion of a culture in its death throes. “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” is explicit on this: Western society in the nineteenth century reached that fatal phase in which, like Alexandrian Greece or late Mandarin China, it became “less and less able . . . to justify the inevitability of its particular forms” and thus to


keep alive “the accepted notions upon which artists and writers must depend in large part for communication with their audiences” (“AK,” p. 34). Such a situation is usually fatal to seriousness in art. At the end of a culture, when all the verities of religion, authority, tradition, and style—all the ideological cement of society, in other words—are either disputed or doubted or believed in for convenience’ sake and not held to entail anything much—at such a moment “the writer or artist is no longer able to estimate the response of his audience to the symbols and references with which he works.” In the past that had meant an art which therefore left the really important issues to one side and contented itself with “virtuosity in the small details of form, all larger questions being [mechanically, listlessly] decided by the precedent of the old masters” (“AK,” pp. 34–35).

Clearly, says Greenberg, there has been a “decay of our present society”—the words are his—which corresponds in many ways to all these gloomy precedents. What is new is the course of art in this situation. No doubt bourgeois culture is in crisis, more and more unable since Marx “to justify the inevitability of its particular forms”; but it has spawned, half in opposition to itself, half at its service, a peculiar and durable artistic tradition—the one we call modernist and what Greenberg then called, using its own label, avant-garde. “It was to be the task of the avant-garde to perform in opposition to bourgeois society the function of finding new and adequate cultural forms for the expression of that same society, without at the same time succumbing to its ideological divisions and its refusal to permit the arts to be their own justification” (“NL,” p. 301).

There are several stresses here worth distinguishing. First, the avant-garde is “part of Western bourgeois society” and yet in some important way estranged from it: needing, as Greenberg phrases it, the revolutionary gloss put on the very “concept of the ‘bourgeois’ in order to define what they were not” (“AK,” p. 35) but at the same time performing the function of finding forms “for the expression” of bourgeois society and tied to it “by an umbilical cord of gold.” Here is the crucial passage: “it is to the [ruling class] that the avant-garde belongs. No culture can develop without a social basis, without a source of stable income. [We might immediately protest at this point at what seems to be the text’s outlandish economism: “social basis” is one thing, “source of income” another; the sentence seems to elide them. But let it pass for the moment.] In the case of the avant-garde this [social basis] was provided by an elite among the ruling class of that society from which it assumed itself to be cut off, but to which it has always remained attached by an umbilical cord of gold” (“AK,” p. 38).

That is the first stress: the contradictory belonging-together-in-opposition of the avant-garde and its bourgeoisie; and the sense—the
pressing and anxious sense—of that connection-in-difference being attenuated, being on the point of severance. For “culture is being abandoned by those to whom it actually belongs—our ruling class” (“AK,” p. 38): the avant-garde, in its specialization and estrangement, had always been a sign of that abandonment, and now it seemed as if the breach was close to final.

Second, the avant-garde is a way to protect art from “ideological divisions.” “Ideological confusion and violence” are the enemies of artistic force and concentration: art seeks a space of its own apart from them, apart from the endless uncertainty of meanings in capitalist society (“AK,” p. 36). It is plain how this connects with my previous wondering about Greenberg on Brecht, and I shall not press the point here, except to say that there is a special and refutable move being made in the argument: to compare the conditions in which, in late capitalism, the meanings of the ruling class are actively disputed with those in which, in Hellenistic Egypt, say, established meanings stultified and became subject to skepticism—this is to compare the utterly unlike. It is to put side by side a time of economic and cultural dissolution—an epoch of weariness and unconcern—and one of articulated and fierce class struggle. Capital may be uncertain of its values, but it is not weary; the bourgeoisie may have no beliefs worth the name, but they will not admit as much: they are hypocrites, not skeptics. And the avant-garde, I shall argue, has regularly and rightly seen an advantage for art in the particular conditions of “ideological confusion and violence” under capital; it has wished to take part in the general, untidy work of negation and has seen no necessary contradiction (rather the contrary) between doing so and coming to terms once again with its “medium.”

But I shall return to this later. It is enough for now to point to this second stress, and to the third: the idea that one chief purpose of the avant-garde was to oppose bourgeois society’s “refusal to permit the arts to be their own justification.” This is the stress which leads on to the more familiar—and trenchant—arguments of the essays in question, which I shall indicate even more briefly: the description of the ersatz art produced for mass consumption by the ruling classes of late capitalism as part of their vile stage management of democracy, their pretending—it becomes perfunctory of late—“that the masses actually rule”; and the subtle account of the main strands in the avant-garde’s history and the way they have all conspired to narrow and raise art “to the expression of an absolute” (“AK,” p. 36). The pursuit has been purity, whatever the detours and self-deceptions. “The arts lie safe now, each within its ‘legitimate’ boundaries, and free trade has been replaced by autarchy. Purity in art consists in the acceptance . . . of the limitations of the medium. . . . The arts, then, have been hunted back [the wording is odd and pondered] to their mediums, and there they have been isolated,
concentrated and defined" ("NL," p. 305). The logic is ineluctable, it "holds the artist in a vise," and time and again it overrides the most impure and ill-advised intentions:

A good many of the artists—if not the majority—who contributed importantly to the development of modern painting came to it with the desire to exploit the break with imitative realism for a more powerful expressiveness, but so inexorable was the logic of the development that in the end their work constituted but another step towards abstract art, and a further sterilization of the expressive factors. This has been true, whether the artist was Van Gogh, Picasso or Klee. All roads lead to the same place. ["NL," pp. 309–10]

This is enough of summary. I do not want now, whatever the temptation, to pitch in with questions about specific cases (Is that true of van Gogh? What is the balance in collage between medium and illusion? etc.) Greenberg’s argument of course provokes such questions, as arguments should do, but I want to restrict myself, if I can, to describing its general logic, inexorable or not, choosing my examples for their bearing on the author’s overall gist.

Let me go back to the start of “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.” It seems to be an unstated assumption of that article—and an entirely reasonable one, I believe—that there once was a time, before the avant-garde, when the bourgeoisie, like any normal ruling class, possessed a culture and an art which were directly and recognizably its own. And indeed we know what is meant by the claim: we know what it means, whatever the provisos and equivocations, to call Chardin and Hogarth bourgeois painters or Samuel Richardson and Daniel Defoe novelists of the middle class. We can move forward a century and still be confident in calling Balzac and Stendhal likewise, or Constable and Géricault. Of course there are degrees of difference and dissociation always—Balzac’s politics, Géricault’s alienation, Chardin’s royal clientele—but the bourgeoisie, we can say, in some strong sense possessed this art: the art enacted, clarified, and criticized the class’ experiences, its appearance and values; it responded to its demands and assumptions. There was a distinctive bourgeois culture; this art is part of our evidence for just such an assertion.

But it is clear also that from the later nineteenth century on, the distinctiveness and coherence of that bourgeois identity began to fade. “Fade” is too weak and passive a word, I think. I should say that the bourgeoisie was obliged to dismantle its focused identity, as part of the price it paid for maintaining social control. As part of its struggle for power over other classes, subordinate and voiceless in the social order but not placated, it was forced to dissolve its claim to culture—and in particular forced to revoke the claim, which is palpable in Géricault or
Stendhal, say, to take up and dominate and preserve the absolutes of aristocracy, the values of the class it displaced. “It’s Athene whom we want,” Greenberg blurs out in a footnote once, “formal culture with its infinity of aspects, its luxuriance, its large comprehension” (“AK,” p. 49 n.5). Add to those qualities intransigence, intensity and risk in the life of the emotions, fierce regard for honour and desire for accurate self-consciousness, disdain for the commonplace, rage for order, insistence that the world cohere: these are, are they not, the qualities we tend to associate with art itself, at its highest moments in the Western tradition. But they are specifically feudal ruling-class superlatives: they are the ones the bourgeoisie believed they had inherited and the ones they chose to abandon because they became, in the class struggles after 1870, a cultural liability.

Hence what Greenberg calls kitsch. Kitsch is the sign of a bourgeoisie contriving to lose its identity, forfeiting the inconvenient absolutes of Le Rouge et le noir or The Oath of the Horatii. It is an art and a culture of instant assimilation, of abject reconciliation to the everyday, of avoidance of difficulty, pretence to indifference, equality before the image of capital.

Modernism is born in reaction to this state of affairs. And you will see, I hope, the peculiar difficulty here. There had once been, let me say again, a bourgeois identity and a classic nineteenth-century bourgeois culture. But as the bourgeoisie built itself the forms of mass society and thereby entrenched its power, it devised a massified pseudoart and pseudoculture and destroyed its own cultural forms—they had been, remember, a long time maturing, in the centuries of patient accommodation to and difference from aristocratic or absolutist rule. Now, Greenberg says, I think rightly, that some kind of connection exists between this bourgeoisie and the art of the avant-garde. The avant-garde is engaged in finding forms for the expression of bourgeois society: that is the phrase again from the “Newer Laocoon.” But what could this mean, exactly, in the age of bourgeois decomposition so eloquently described in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch”? It seems that modernism is being proposed as bourgeois art in the absence of a bourgeoisie or, more accurately, as aristocratic art in the age when the bourgeoisie abandons its claims to aristocracy. And how will art keep aristocracy alive? By keeping itself alive, as the remaining vessel of the aristocratic account of experience and its modes; by preserving its own means, its media; by proclaiming those means and media as its values, as meanings in themselves.

This is, I think, the crux of the argument. It seems to me that Greenberg is aware of the paradox involved in his avant-garde preserving bourgeois, in its highest and severest forms, for a bourgeoisie which, in the sense so proposed, no longer existed. He points to the paradox, but he believes the solution to it has proved to be, in practice, the density
and resistance of artistic values per se. They are the repository, as it were, of affect and intelligence that once inhered in a complex form of life but do so no longer; they are the concrete form of intensity and self-consciousness, the only one left, and therefore the form to be preserved at all costs and somehow kept apart from the surrounding desolation.

It is a serious and grim picture of culture under capitalism, and the measure of its bitterness and perplexity seems to me still justified. Eliotic Trotskyism, I called it previously; the cadencies shifting line by line from “Socialism or Barbarism” to “Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca.” (And was Greenberg a reader of Scrutiny, I wonder? It was widely read in New York at this time, I believe.) From his Eliotic stronghold he perceives, and surely with reason, that much of the great art of the previous century, including some which had declared itself avant-garde and anti-bourgeois, had depended on the patronage and mental appetites of a certain fraction of the middle class. It had in some sense belonged to a bourgeois intelligentsia—to a fraction of the class which was self-consciously “progressive” in its tastes and attitudes and often allied to the cause not just of artistic experiment but of social and political reform. And it is surely also true that in late capitalism this independent, critical, and progressive intelligentsia was put to death by its own class. For late capitalism—by which I mean the order emerging from the Great Depression—is a period of cultural uniformity: a leveling-down, a squeezing-out of previous bourgeois élites, a narrowing of distance between class and class and between fractions of the same class. In this case, the distance largely disappears between bourgeois intelligentsia and unintelligentsia: by our own time one might say it is normally impossible to distinguish one from the other.

(And lest this be taken as merely flippant, let me add that the kind of distance I have in mind—and distance here does not mean detachment but precisely an active, uncomfortable difference from the class one belongs to—is that between Walter Lippmann’s salon, say, and the American middle class of its day; or that between the circle around Léon Gambetta and the general ambience of Ordre Moral. This last is especially to the purpose, since its consequences for culture were so vivid: one has only to remember the achievement of Antonin Proust in his brief tenure of the Direction des Beaux-Arts or Georges Clemenceau’s patronage of and friendship with Claude Monet.)

5. Mr. Greenberg informs me the answer here is yes and points out that he even once had an exchange with F. R. Leavis, in Commentary, on Kafka—one which, he says, “I did not come out of too well!” (“How Good Is Kafka?,” Commentary 19 (June 1955).

6. I think this state of affairs lies at the root of those ills of present-day Marxist criticism to which Edward Said refers in “Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and Community.” In the years around 1910, for example, it was possible for Marxist intellectuals to identify a worthwhile enemy within the ranks of the academy—there was a
This description of culture is suitably grim, as I say, and finds its proper echoes in Eliot, Trotsky, F. R. Leavis, and Brecht. And yet—and here at last I modulate into criticism—there seem to me things badly wrong with its final view of art and artistic value. I shall offer three, or perhaps four, kinds of criticism of the view: first, I shall point to the difficulties involved in the very notion of art itself becoming an independent source of value; second, I shall disagree with one of the central elements in Greenberg's account of that value, his reading of "medium" in avant-garde art; and third, I shall try to recast his sketch of modernism's formal logic in order to include aspects of avant-garde practice which he overlooks or belittles but which I believe are bound up with those he sees as paramount. What I shall point to here—not to make a mystery of it—are practices of negation in modernist art which seem to me the very form of the practices of purity (the recognitions and enactments of medium) which Greenberg extols. Finally, I shall suggest some ways in which the previous three criticisms are connected, in particular, the relation between those practices of negation and the business of bourgeois artists making do without a bourgeoisie. I shall be brief, and the criticisms may seem schematic. But my hope is that because they are anyway simple objections to points in an argument where it appears palpably weak, they will, schematic or not, seem quite reasonable.

The first disagreement could be introduced by asking the following
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(Wittgensteinian) question: What would it be like, exactly, for art to possess its own values? Not just to have, in other words, a set of distinctive effects and procedures but to have them somehow be, or provide, the standards by which the effects and procedures are held to be of worth? I may as well say at once that there seem, on the face of it, some insuperable logical difficulties here, and they may well stand in the way of ever providing a coherent reply to the Wittgensteinian question. But I much prefer to give—or to sketch—a kind of historical answer to the question, in which the point of asking it in the first place might be made more clear.

Let us concede that Greenberg may be roughly right when he says in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” that “a fairly constant distinction” has been made by “the cultivated of mankind over the ages” “between those values only to be found in art and the values which can be found elsewhere” (“AK,” p. 42). But let us ask how that distinction was actually made—made and maintained, as an active opposition—in practice, in the first heyday of the art called avant-garde. For the sake of vividness, we might choose the case of the young speculator Dupuy, whom Camille Pissarro described in 1890 as “mon meilleur amateur” and who killed himself the same year, to Pissarro’s chagrin, because he believed he was faced with bankruptcy. One’s picture of such a patron is necessarily speculative in its turn, but what I want to suggest is nothing very debatable. It seems clear from the evidence that Dupuy was someone capable of savouring the separateness of art, its irreducible difficulties and appeal. That was what presumably won him Pissarro’s respect and led him to buy the most problematic art of his day. (This at a time, remember, when Pissarro’s regular patrons, and dealers, had quietly sloped off in search of something less odd.) But I would suggest that he also saw—and in some sense insisted on—a kind of consonance between the experience and value that art had to offer and those that belonged to his everyday life. The consonance did not need to be direct and, indeed, could not be. Dupuy was not in the market for animated pictures of the Stock Exchange—the kind he could have got from Jean Béraud—or even for scenes à la Degas in which he might have been offered back, dramatically, the shifts and upsets of life in the big city. He purchased landscapes instead and seems to have had a taste for those painted in the neo-impressionist manner—painted, that is, in a way which tried to be tight, discreet, and uniform, done with a disabused orderliness, seemingly scientific, certainly analytic. And all of these qualities, we might guess, he savoured and required as the signs of art’s detachment.

Yet surely we must also say that his openness to such qualities, his ability to understand them, was founded in a sense he had of some play between those qualities occurring in art and the same occurring in life—occurring in his life, not on the face of it a happy one but one at the
cutting edge of capitalism still. And when we remember what capitalism was in 1890, we are surely better able to understand why Dupuy invested in Georges Seurat. For this was a capital still confident in its powers, if shaken; and not merely confident, but scrupulous: still in active dialogue with science; still producing distinctive rhetorics and modes of appraising experience; still conscious of its own values—the tests of rationality, the power born of observation and control; still, if you wish, believing in the commodity as a (perplexing) form of freedom.

You see my point, I hope. I believe it was the interplay of these values and the values of art which made the distinction between them an active and possible one—made it a distinction at all, as opposed to a rigid and absolute disjunction. In the case of Dupuy, there was difference-yet-consonance between the values which made for the bourgeois' sense of himself in practical life and those he required from avant-garde painting. The facts of art and the facts of capital were in active tension. They were still negotiating with each other; they could still, at moments, in particular cases like Dupuy’s, contrive to put each other’s categories in doubt.

This, it seems to me, is what is meant by “a fairly constant distinction [being] made between those values only to be found in art and the values which can be found elsewhere.” It is a negotiated distinction, with the critic of Diderot’s or Baudelaire’s or Félix Fénéon’s type the active agent of the settlement. For critics like these, and in the art they typically address, it is true that the values a painting offers are discovered, time and again and with vehemence, as different and irreducible. And we understand the point of Fénéon’s insistence; but we are the more impressed by it precisely because the values are found to be different as part of a real cultural dialectic, by which I mean that they are visibly under pressure, in the text, from the demands and valuations made by the ruling class in the business of ruling—the meanings it makes and disseminates, the kinds of order it proposes as its own. It is this pressure—and the way it is enacted in the patronage relation or in the artist’s imagining of his or her public—which keeps the values of art from becoming a merely academic canon.

I hope it is clear how this account of artistic standards—and particularly of the ways in which art’s separateness as a social practice is secured—would call into question Greenberg’s hope that art could become a provider of value in its own right. Yet I think I can call that belief in question more effectively simply by looking at one or another of the facts of art which Greenberg takes to have become a value, in some sense: let me look, for simplicity’s sake, at the notorious fact of “flatness.” Now it is certainly true that the literal flatness of the picture surface was recovered at regular intervals as a striking fact by painters after Courbet. But I think that the question we should ask in this case is why that simple,
empirical presence went on being interesting for art. How could a fact of effect or procedure stand in for value in this way? What was it that made it vivid?

The answer is not far to seek. I think we can say that the fact of flatness was vivid and tractable—as it was in the art of Cézanne, for example, or that of Matisse—because it was made to stand for something: some particular and resistant set of qualities, taking its place in an articulated account of experience. The richness of the avant-garde, as a set of contexts for art in the years between 1860 and 1918, say, might thus be redescribed in terms of its ability to give flatness such complex and compatible values—values which necessarily derived from elsewhere than art. It could stand, that flatness, as an analogue of the “popular”—something therefore conceived as plain, workmanlike, and emphatic. Or it could signify “modernity,” with flatness meant to conjure up the mere two dimensions of posters, labels, fashion prints, and photographs. Equally, unbrokenness of surface could be seen—by Cézanne, for example—as standing for the truth of seeing, the actual form of our knowledge of things. And that very claim was repeatedly felt, by artist and audience, to be some kind of aggression on the latter: flatness appeared as a barrier to the ordinary bourgeois’ wish to enter a picture and dream, to have it be a space apart from life in which the mind would be free to make its own connections.

My point is simply that flatness in its heyday was these various meanings and valuations; they were its substance, so to speak; they were what it was seen as. Their particularity was what made it vivid—made it a matter to be painted over again. Flatness was therefore in play—as an irreducible, technical “fact” of painting—with all of these totalizations, all of these attempts to make it a metaphor. Of course in a sense it resisted the metaphors, and the painters we most admire insisted also on it as an awkward, empirical quiddity; but the “also” is the key word here: there was no fact without the metaphor, no medium without its being the vehicle of a complex act of meaning.

This leads me directly to my third criticism of Greenberg’s account. It could be broached most forcefully, I think, by asking the question, How does the medium most often appear in modernist art? If we accept (as we ought to, I feel) that avant-garde painting, poetry, and music are characterized by an insistence on medium, then what kind of insistence has it been, usually? My answer would be—it is hardly an original one—that the medium has appeared most characteristically as the site of negation and estrangement.

The very way that modernist art has insisted on its medium has been by negating that medium’s ordinary consistency—by pulling it apart, emptying it, producing gaps and silences, making it stand as the opposite of sense or continuity, having matter be the synonym for resistance. (And why, after all, should matter be “resistant”? It is a modernist piety
with a fairly dim ontology appended.) Modernism would have its medium be absence of some sort—absence of finish or coherence, indeterminacy, a ground which is called on to swallow up distinctions.

These are familiar avant-garde strategies; and I am not for a moment suggesting that Greenberg does not recognize their part in the art he admires. Yet he is notoriously uneasy with them and prepared to declare them extrinsic to the real business of art in our time—the business of each art “determin[ing], through the operations peculiar to itself, the effects peculiar and exclusive to itself.” It is Greenberg’s disdain for the rhetoric of negation which underlies, one supposes, the ruefulness of his description of Jackson Pollock as, after all, a “Gothic” whose art harked back to Faulkner and Melville in its “violence, exasperation and stridency.” It is certainly the same disdain which determines his verdict on Dada, which is only important, he feels, as a complaisant topic for journalism about the modern crisis (or the shock of the new). And one does know what he means by the charge; one does feel the fire of his sarcasm, in 1947, when, in the middle of dealing well with Pollock’s unlikely achievement, he writes: “In the face of current events, painting feels, apparently, that it must be more than itself: that it must be epic poetry, it must be theatre, it must be an atomic bomb, it must be the rights of Man. But the greatest painter of our time, Matisse, preeminently demonstrated the sincerity and penetration that go with the kind of greatness particular to twentieth century painting by saying that he wanted his art to be an armchair for the tired business man.”

It is splendid, it is salutary, it is congenial. Yet surely in the end it will not quite do as description. Surely it is part of modernism’s problem—even Matisse’s—that the tired businessman be so weary and vacant and so little interested in art as his armchair. It is this situation—this lack of an adequate ruling class to address—which goes largely to explain modernism’s negative cast.

I think that finally my differences with Greenberg centre on this one. I do not believe that the practices of negation which Greenberg seeks to declare mere noise on the modernist message can be thus demoted. They are simply inseparable from the work of self-definition which he takes to be central: inseparable in the case of Pollock, for certain, or Miro or Picasso or, for that matter, Matisse. Modernism is certainly that art which insists on its medium and says that meaning can henceforth only be found in practice. But the practice in question is extraordinary and desperate: it presents itself as a work of interminable and absolute decomposition, a work which is always pushing “medium” to its limits—to its ending—to the point where it breaks or evaporates or

turns back into mere unworked material. That is the form in which medium is retrieved or reinvented: the fact of Art, in modernism, is the fact of negation.

I believe that this description imposes itself: that it is the only one which can include Mallarmé alongside Rimbaud, Schoenberg alongside Webern, or (dare I say it?) Duchamp beside the Monet of the Nymphéas. And surely that dance of negation has to do with the social facts I have spent most of my time rehearsing—the decline of ruling-class élites, the absence of a "social base" for artistic production, the paradox involved in making bourgeois art in the absence of a bourgeoisie. Negation is the sign inside art of this wider decomposition: it is an attempt to capture the lack of consistent and repeatable meanings in the culture—to capture the lack and make it over into form.

I should make the extent of this, my last disagreement with Greenberg, clear. The extent is small but definite. It is not, of course, that Greenberg fails to recognize the rootlessness and isolation of the avant-garde; his writing is full of the recognition, and he knows as well as anyone the miseries inherent in such a loss of place. But he does believe—the vehemence of the belief is what is most impressive in his writing—that art can substitute itself for the values capitalism has made valueless. A refusal to share that belief—and that is finally what I am urging—would have its basis in the following three observations. First, to repeat, negation is inscribed in the very practice of modernism, as the form in which art appears to itself as a value. Second, that negativity does not appear as a practice which guarantees meaning or opens out a space for free play and fantasy—in the manner of the joke, for example, or even of irony—but, rather, negation appears as an absolute and all-encompassing fact, something which once begun is cumulative and uncontrollable; a fact which swallows meaning altogether. The road leads back and back to the black square, the hardly differentiated field of sound, the infinitely flimsy skein of spectral colour, speech stuttering and petering out into etceteras or excuses. ("I am obliged to believe that these are statements having to do with a world, . . . but you, the reader, need not. . . . And I and You, oh well. . . . The poem offers a way out of itself, hereabouts. . . . But do not take it, wholly. . . ." And so on.) On the other side of negation is always emptiness: that is a message which modernism never tires of repeating and a territory into which it regularly strays. We have an art in which ambiguity becomes infinite, which is on the verge of proposing—and does propose—an Other which is comfortably ineffable, a vacuity, a vagueness, a mere mysticism of sight.10

10. The editor of Critical Inquiry suggested that I say a little more about the negative cast I ascribe to modernism and give an example or two. Too many examples crowd to mind, and I ought to avoid the more glamorous, since what I am referring to is an aspect or moment of modernist art, most often mixed up with other purposes or techniques, though often, I would argue, dominating them. Nevertheless a phrase from Leavis' New Bearings
There is a way—and this again is something which happens *within* modernism or at its limits—in which that empty negation is in turn negated. And that brings me back finally to the most basic of Greenberg’s assumptions; it brings me back to the essays on Brecht. For there is an art—a modernist art—which has challenged the notion that art stands only to suffer from the fact that now all meanings are disputable. There is an art—Brecht’s is only the most doctrinaire example—which says that we live not simply in a period of cultural decline, when meanings have become muddy and stale, but rather in a period when one set of meanings—those of the cultivated classes—is fitfully contested by those who stand to gain from their collapse. There is a difference, in other words, between Alexandrianism and class struggle. The twentieth century has elements of both situations about it, and that is why Greenberg’s description, based on the Alexandrian analogy, applies as well as it does. But the end of the bourgeoisie is not, or will not be, like the end of Ptolemy’s patriciate. And the end of its art will be likewise unprecedented. It will involve, and has involved, the kinds of inward turning that Greenberg has described so compellingly. But it will also involve—and has involved, as part of the practice of modernism—a search for another place in the social order. Art wants to address someone, it wants something precise and extended to do; it wants *resistance*, it needs criteria; it will take risks in order to find them, including the risk of its own dissolution.\(^1\) Greenberg is surely entitled to judge that risk occurs, in which the critic describes T. S. Eliot’s “effort to express formlessness itself as form,” and the lines (among others) which that phrase applies to: “Shape without form, shade without colour, / Paralysed force, gesture without motion.” Yet we would do best to descend from these obvious heights and, if glamour is what is wanted, contemplate Ad Reinhardt’s description of his own black painting in 1962:

A square (neutral, shapeless) canvas, five feet wide, five feet high, as high as a man, as wide as a man’s outstretched arms (not large, not small, sizeless), trisected (no composition), one horizontal form negating one vertical form (formless, no top, no bottom, directionless), three (more or less) dark (lightless) non-contrasting (colorless) colors, brushwork brushed out to remove brushwork, a matt, flat, free-hand painted surface (glossless, textureless, non-linear, no hard-edge, no soft-edge) which does not reflect its surroundings—a pure, abstract, non-objective, timeless, spaceless, changeless, relationless, disinterested painting—an object that is self-conscious (no unconsciousness), ideal transcendent, aware of no thing but art (absolutely no anti-art). [Art, USA, Now (New York, 1963), p. 269]

This pretends to be ironical, of course, and the art it gives rise to is negligible now, I dare say, even by received modernist standards; but the passage only puts into words a kind of attitude and practice which is by no means eccentric since Baudelaire and which has often issued in art of peculiar forcefulness and gravity.

\(^1\) This is not to smuggle in a demand for realism again by the back door; or at least, not one posed in the traditional manner. The weakness or absence I have pointed to in modern art does not derive, I think, from a lack of grounding in “seeing” (for example) or a set of realist protocols to go with that; rather, it derives from its lack of grounding in some (any) specific practice of representation, which would be linked in turn to other social
too great and, even more, to be impatient with the pretense of risk so dear to one fringe of modernist art and its patrons—all that stuff about blurring the boundaries between art and life and the patter about art being “revolutionary.” Entitled he is; but not in my opinion right. The risk is large and the patter odious; but the alternative, I believe, is on the whole worse. It is what we have, as the present form of modernism: an art whose object is nothing but itself, which never tires of discovering that that self is pure as only pure negativity can be, and which offers its audience that nothing, tirelessly and, I concede, adequately made over into form. A verdict on such an art is not a matter of taste—for who could fail to admire, very often, its refinement and ingenuity—but involves a judgment, still, of cultural possibility. Thus while it seems to me right to expect little from the life and art of late capitalism, I still draw back from believing that the best one can hope for from art, even in extremis, is its own singular and perfect disembodiment.

practices—embedded in them, constrained by them. The question is not, therefore, whether modern art should be figurative or abstract, rooted in empirical commitments or not so rooted, but whether art is now provided with sufficient constraints of any kind—nations of appropriateness, tests of vividness, demands which bring with them measures of importance or priority. Without constraints, representation of any articulateness and salience cannot take place. (One might ask if the constraints which modernism declares to be its own and sufficient—those of the medium or of an individual’s emotions and sense of inner truth—are binding or indeed coherent; or, to be harsh, if the areas of practice which it points to as the sites of such constraint—medium, emotion, even “language” [sacred cow]—are existents at all, in the way that is claimed for them.)